In this case, the ACLU takes on California's "drunk in public" statute (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f) fn. 1) on numerous Eighth Amendment and due process grounds, in particular its enforcement in Los Angeles County. The lawsuit was filed by four who had been cited under this statute, as well as one taxpayer. They cite statistics that show that, excluding traffic arrests, "drunk in public arrests" are the second hightest volume crime in the country. For example: "In 1975, the year in which the complaint in this case was filed, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) made 50,595 section 647(f) arrests. These arrests constituted 32.1 percent of the LAPD's total misdemeanor arrests for that year." They also note that many, or most, of these arrests happen during a "sweep" of areas like Skid Row (a blocks-long homeless encampment near downtown Los Angeles), and because of the high volume of arrests, the police have developed expedited procedures for "drunk in public" arrests that exlude procedures like sobriety tests. They detail the inhumane conditions in which the arrested are transported and then kept in while in jail. The plaintiffs "seek an order enjoining enforcement of section 647(f) in light of many alleged constitutional abuses attendant upon enforcement of the statute in Los Angeles County. They also seek an order mandating referral of all public inebriates to civil detoxification centers in lieu of criminal prosecution." They argued that this enforcement of this statute violates the "cruel and unusual punishment" clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution. They also argue that diverting the arrested to civil detoxification centers is "cheaper and more effective" than prosecution.

The court, in response, writes: "Although section 647(f) is a valid penal statute, plaintiffs urge this court to override the legislative judgment and effectively decriminalize public intoxication on the ground that civil detoxification is cheaper and more effective than prosecution of public inebriates. This court declines to intrude so far into the legislative prerogative." They suggest that the case should be returned to a lower court for reconsideration ("remanded") "for a determination whether County defendants should be enjoined from incarcerating section 647(f) arrestees in prearraignment jail facilities that do not offer medical screening and monitoring by trained personnel."