This case, much like United States of America [Davis] v. City and County of San Francisco [firefighters], concerns an allegation of discriminatory hiring practices in a fire department - here, the City of Berkeley. It considers the issue of a proportional racial hiring quota, based on the percentages of each of population in the City of Berkeley, and proposes hiring according to such a quota to ensure equal opportunity for promotion to populations underrrepresented in fire department leadership. The question here is whether a government entity with, allegedly, "no prior history of discimination" (as affirmed by both an affirmative action officer, as well as a current and former Fire Chief) should be required to participate in such a quota system (called, in Berkeley, AAP, or Affirmative Action Program and adopted in 1972). The constitutionality of AAP is challenged in this case, in which plaintiff Rayford R. Hiatt (presumably a white man, but this information is not included in the case summary) alleges racial descrimination due to the fact that a candidate from an underrrepresented group was promoted instead of him, despite his higher score on an examination (the use of which as a promotional tool runs contrary to the mandate of AAP).

While acknoledging that both the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, in their words, "accord any person the equal protection of the laws in plain and unequivocal language and without qualification, it is well settled that different classifications of citizens, including classification by race, are not per se illegal, much less unconstitutional." However, the court is unsympathetic to the needs of these underrepresented populations, and differentiates between racial and sexual representation. The court invokes title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). They write: "By its simple reading, title VII proscribes employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin in unconditional language and without any qualification (42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)).   Addressing the very problem that is before us, section 703, subdivision (j), of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(j)), provides in equally clear and explicit terms that racial preferences are not required to be granted to any employee or group of employees on account of racial imbalance either."

After lengthly consideration, the court writes: "The judgment, insofar as it fails to make an award of attorney fees to respondents, is reversed, with directions to the trial court to reconsider appellants' motion for attorney fees in light of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and to enter judgment for any attorney fees to which it finds appellants entitled.   Those portions of the judgment enjoining that part of paragraph III of AAP pertaining to the use of written tests, and the whole of paragraph V of AAP regarding employment list qualifying categories are reversed.   In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed."