These three cases, consolidated on appeal, concern the denial of non-immigrant Visas to non-Americans who wishedto visit the United States in response to invitations from U.S. citizens and residents to attend meetings or address audiences here, such as an invitation extended to Italian peace activist Nino Pasti by nuclear disarmament groups in Cronin v. Shultz in 1982. City of New York v. Shultz, in 1983, concerns invitations to two Cuban women, Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, who were invited by the Commission on the Status of Women as well as various women's studies programs to speak about the status of women and family law in Cuba. Abourezk v. Reagan, also in 1983, deals with an invitation to Tomas Borge, the Interior Minister of Nicaragua, from a diverse group of United States citizens — including members of Congress, university professors, journalists, and religious leaders. The plaintiffs argued that the denial of these Visas exceeded the State Department's authority under subsection (27) and violated their First Amendment rights to engage in dialogue with these individuals.

These cases consider at length the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and the provision (Section 1329) which states: "[t]he district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of this subchapter [of the Immigration Act]." The State Department cites, as reason for their denials of these Visas, "the continuing status of these aliens [sic] as members of organizations or governments hostile to the United States." The case closely examines subsection (27), which delineates the types of Visa denials that are sactioned, including "an alien [sic] who might engage in conspiratorial activity against the United States while in the country; an alien [sic] who is known to be a member of a terrorist organization; an alien [sic] who is associated with a criminal organization; and an alien [sic] official who engaged in physical brutality while in power or was associated with a regime that did so." Finally, the court considers an example in which "the mere entry of the alien [sic] would prejudice foreign policy objectives," which would seem to grant the State Department broad authority to interpret this as they wish. The court also considers subsection (28) which "was enacted by a Congress that wished to exclude, as a general rule, all members of whatever level of participation in any communist, anarchist, or totalitarian organization." They also write: "The distinction is real and important between a generalized congressional distrust of communist ideology and organizations and a specific Executive concern over admitting a particular person associated with a foreign government that the Executive considers in some respects adversarial to ours."

The case considers at length the McGovern Amendment, which applies only to the former. Considering such important and weighty issues as the limits of Executive authority and the legacy of Cold War practices, the case concludes that, "The majority's opinion is a cautious one: major issues presented in this litigation are left for subsequent resolution." The court cites Supreme Court precedent which "has repeatedly upheld the legitimacy of broad and discretionary Executive power." The court worries about further "judicial incursion into the United States' conduct of its foreign affairs."